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How Sweden’s Unemployment 
Became More Like Europe’s
Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
The main diﬃculty with the Eurosclerosis hypothesis is one of 
timing. Although details can be debated, no strong case exists 
that Europe’s welfare states were much more extensive or intru-
sive in the 1970s than in the 1960s, and no case at all exists that 
there was more interference in markets in the 1980s than in the 
1970s. Why did a social system that seemed to work extremely 
well in the 1960s work increasingly badly thereafter?
—Krugman (1987, 68)
6.1    Introduction
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) applied an equilibrium version of a McCall 
(1970) search model to explain the striking ﬁ  rst graph in Lindbeck et al. 
(1994). That graph shows that from the mid-  1970s until the early 1990s, the 
Swedish unemployment rate was lower than in other Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and in the early 
1990s, it jumped to the much higher level exhibited by an average of OECD 
countries’ unemployment levels since the early 1980s.1 After noting that Swe-
den had no signiﬁ  cant problem with long- term unemployment before 1990, 
Lindbeck et al. (1994, 6) stated, “There is now an obvious risk that Sweden 
will go the same way [as the rest of Europe],” and “It should be an overriding 
task of economic policy to prevent creating a large group of permanently 
unemployed citizens . . .” Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) presented a model 
that explained the set of policies that had allowed Sweden to attain its excep-
tionally low unemployment rates from 1975 to 1990 but that also posed a 
nightmare scenario in which a macroeconomic shock would make one of 
those policies become unsustainable; its absence then would make long- term 
unemployment and a high unemployment rate persist in Sweden.
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1. But still, it remained below the average for OECD countries in Europe.190        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
This chapter updates our earlier work in light of recent data about 
Swedish labor market outcomes. We read these data as saying yes, Swed-
ish outcomes have become more like Europe’s, as Lindbeck and his co-
authors feared. To shed light on why, we describe extensions of our earlier 
theoretical work that are designed to understand some important factors 
that have contributed to the labor market outcomes in Europe since World 
War II. Important countries in Western Europe have experienced twenty-
 ﬁ ve years of high unemployment. Substantial fractions of their populations 
have been unemployed for long periods of time. But it was not like that 
in the 1960s, and it is very important for us to explain that, too, because 
ultimately, we shall attribute the persistently high level of European unem-
ployment after 1980 to the higher safety nets and more generous unem-
ployment beneﬁ  ts systems that prevail in Europe compared to the United 
States. The epigraph from Krugman (1987) concisely expresses the challenge 
confronting any such “high safety nets did it” explanation of high post- 1980 
European unemployment: European unemployment rates were lower than 
those in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, despite the fact that 
Europe had more generous safety nets then, too. We explain higher-  than-
 U.S. European unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s after lower- than- U.S. 
European unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s by bringing to light the 
macroeconomic implications of a force whose presence we infer from diverse 
sources of evidence about how the microeconomic risks facing individual 
workers have increased over time. For short, we label as turbulence the con-
ﬂ  uence of forces that have increased those risks over time. Our explanation 
of European unemployment stresses how safety nets inﬂ  uence how work-
ers should cope with the emergence of a more challenging and turbulent 
economic environment after the early 1980s. Within a model that captures 
precise notions of frictional and structural unemployment,2 we study how 
an increase in microeconomic turbulence on the one hand impinges on a 
welfare state economy with both high government-  supplied unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) and strong government-  mandated employment pro-
tection (EP) and on the other hand impinges on a laissez-  faire economy 
with neither of those labor market institutions. We show that in times with 
low turbulence, the welfare state has lower unemployment, but in turbu-
lent times, it has higher unemployment. We shall explain these outcomes in 
terms of how employment protection suppresses frictional but not structural 
unemployment.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 brieﬂ  y recalls recent pat-
terns of Swedish unemployment and how we sought to explain them in 
2. Frictional unemployment refers to the normal but time-  consuming process of workers 
looking for jobs in an economy with search frictions. We let structural unemployment denote 
any additional unemployment that arises in a malfunctioning labor market. In our analysis, 
frictional and structural unemployment become synonymous with short-  and long- term unem-
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Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995a, 1995b, 1997). Section 6.3 describes facts 
about European and U.S. unemployment outcomes, labor market institu-
tions, and earnings volatility that we use to frame the theoretical and compu-
tational work that we describe in sections 6.4 and 6.5. Section 6.6 interprets 
outcomes in Sweden in light of our model. Section 6.7 concludes by discuss-
ing proposals for reforming Swedish labor market institutions.
6.2      Our Mid-  1990s Analysis of Sweden
6.2.1      Salient Facts about Sweden
We synthesized our quantitative explanation for the intertemporal pattern 
of Swedish unemployment portrayed in that ﬁ  rst graph of Lindbeck et al. 
(1994) by building a model that could incorporate the following empirical 
patterns that we detected in the Swedish experience.
￿    The Swedish UI system had oﬀered generous beneﬁ  ts to insured male 
blue-  collar workers since the beginning of our time series, but the 
replacement ratio for all unemployed workers started to increase in the 
mid-  1970s and had almost converged with the generous replacement 
ratio of insured male blue-  collar workers by the mid-  1980s.
￿   Swedish income taxes became substantially more progressive—mar-
ginal tax wedges went above 70 percent for both blue-  collar and white-
  collar workers in the 1970s.
￿    The Swedish government was exceptional among European countries 
in intervening in workers’ search processes by monitoring them to make 
sure that they accepted job oﬀers that the government deemed to be 
acceptable.
To us, the search model of McCall (1970) seemed an ideal vehicle for 
bringing in these features.3
6.2.2      Our Mid-  1990s McCall Search Model for Sweden
The classic single-  worker search model of McCall (1970) envisioned an 
inﬁ  nitely lived, risk- neutral unemployed worker who discounts the future at 
a constant factor   ∈ (0, 1). At the beginning of each period that he or she 
is unemployed, the worker draws one oﬀer to work forever at a wage w from 
a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, 
he or she receives present value w/ (1  –    ). If the worker rejects the oﬀer, he 
or she receives unemployment compensation c this period and must wait one 
period until getting a new draw. The value of taking this option is c    Q, 
3. While we accepted what we understood to be a consensus view that other active labor 
market programs had minimal eﬀects on labor market outcomes, we decided to highlight the 
government’s monitoring program in our theoretical work.192        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
where Q is the expected value for the problem of an unemployed worker at 
the beginning of a period before he or she has drawn a wage oﬀer. Successive 
draws from F are statistically independent.
The McCall worker optimally rejects oﬀers less and accepts oﬀers greater 
than a reservation wage w . Key implications of McCall’s model are that w  
increases with increases in unemployment compensation c and also with 
mean-  preserving increases in the spread of the oﬀer distribution F.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995a, 1995b, 1997) adapted and extended 
McCall’s model to create an equilibrium model of the Swedish unemploy-
ment experience. We added the following ingredients to the basic McCall 
model: (a) each period, a worker makes a search intensity decision that 
aﬀects the probability that he or she succeeds in drawing an oﬀer from F; (b) 
instead of drawing a single wage forever, a job oﬀer entitles a worker to work 
at a wage that occasionally will be reset by drawing from some distribution 
G; (c) there is a ﬁ  xed rate of exogenous job destruction, so all jobs eventu-
ally end; (d) a progressive tax system transforms the pretax distributions of 
wages F and G into posttax distributions that are more compressed;4 (e) the 
government terminates UI beneﬁ  ts to all workers who reject oﬀers above a 
government- set minimum acceptable wage wg; and (f) a government budget 
condition and appropriate stationary conditions for the aggregate state of 
the economy that determine equilibrium rates of employment and unem-
ployment complete the model.
Items (a) and (e) created avenues by which unemployment compensa-
tion c and the government-  mandated acceptable wage wg inﬂ  uenced search 
intensities and reservation wages. Item (b) created an avenue for endogenous 
job destruction. The acceptable wage wg in (e) allowed us to turn on and oﬀ 
a program that earlier researchers had observed to be an unusual aspect of 
Swedish labor market policies.
This is a model in which countervailing forces combine to determine an 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Ceteribus paribus, more generous unem-
ployment compensation raises the worker’s reservation wage, the duration 
of a typical unemployment spell, and the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
By decreasing the option value of searching, an increase in the progressivity 
of taxes causes the reservation wage, the duration of unemployment, and 
the equilibrium unemployment rate all to fall. By decreasing the reservation 
wage, a decrease in the government- mandated acceptable wage wg causes the 
unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment to fall.
This theory gives the government enough empirically plausible handles 
for us to explain the previously mentioned chart in Lindbeck et al. (1994). 
Our story is that the tendency for unemployment to increase caused by 
4. Pissarides (1983) studied how income taxes inﬂ  uence reservation wages by compressing the 
pertinent after-  tax wage distribution confronting a worker searching for a job. In our analysis, 
we applied that same logic to employed workers who face stochastic upgrades or downgrades 
on the job and who must decide whether to quit and search for a new job.How Sweden’s Unemployment Became More Like Europe’s    1 9 3
Sweden’s increasingly generous system of government-  supplied UI before 
1990 was oﬀset by the increased progressivity of income taxes and the gov-
ernment’s stringent monitoring of workers’ acceptance policies (represented 
by our wg). The nightmare mentioned earlier is that when we computed an 
equilibrium with a much higher wg as a computational experiment to repre-
sent a loosening of the government’s monitoring program, unemployment 
exploded, making the Sweden in our computer no diﬀerent from the average 
OECD country with its high unemployment rate.
This completes our summary of the situation in Sweden up to the mid-
  1990s as we interpreted it in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995a, 1995b, 1997). 
We now turn to describing unemployment outcomes in Western Europe and 
how we think we can explain them.
6.3      Salient Facts about Europe’s Unemployment 
Experience and Turbulence
We divide our brief exposition of the facts into two parts. First, in section 
6.3.1, we summarize how unemployment outcomes and labor market insti-
tutions varied over time and between Europe and the United States. Then, 
in section 6.3.2, we describe a body of microeconomic evidence that provides 
the smoking gun that explains the puzzle posed in the epigraph by Krugman. 
We interpret that evidence in light of a model in section 6.5.
6.3.1      Salient Facts about Unemployment
Research surveyed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) can be summarized 
in terms of the following broad ﬁ  ndings. First, we state some facts about 
unemployment and government labor market interventions:
￿   Because there were higher rates of inﬂ  ow into unemployment in the 
United States, in the 1950s and 1960s, unemployment rates were sys-
tematically lower in Europe than in the United States.
￿    After the 1970s, unemployment became persistently higher in Europe.
￿   Within both Europe and the United States, inﬂ  ow rates into unemploy-
ment remained roughly constant between the 1950s and 1960s, on the 
one hand, and the 1980s and 1990s, on the other hand.
￿   In Europe, in the 1950s and 1960s, average durations of unemploy-
ment spells were low. Throughout Europe, they became high after the 
1970s.
￿   In the United States, after the 1970s, the average duration of unemploy-
ment spells stayed at their low levels of the 1950s and 1960s.
￿   In Europe, after the 1970s, hazard rates of leaving unemployment 
fell with increases in the duration of unemployment. The long-  term 
unemployed in Europe constitute a very diverse group, but as noted by 
Machin and Manning (1999, 3093), “In all countries there is a higher 194        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
incidence of [long-  term unemployment] among older workers and a 
lower rate among young workers.”
￿   Government- supplied unemployment compensation has been generous 
in amount and long in duration in Europe throughout both periods, 
but it has been stingy in amount and short in duration in the United 
States.
￿   Government- mandated employment protection was stronger in Europe 
throughout both periods.
6.3.2      Salient Facts about Turbulence
In this section, we refer to some ﬁ  ndings of microeconomists that indicate 
to us that there has been an increase in what we call turbulence since the 
late 1970s.
While the volatility of many macroeconomic variables has declined since 
the 1980s (see, for example, McConnell and Perez-  Quiros [2000] and Stock 
and Watson [2002]), there is extensive evidence of increased volatility of 
individual workers’ earnings in the United States.5 In an inﬂ  uential early 
study, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) found that the permanent and transi-
tory variances of log annual earnings both rose by approximately 40 percent 
between the periods of 1970 to 1978 and 1979 to 1987. Their ﬁ  ndings have 
proven to be robust across a variety of studies and data sets, as reviewed by 
Katz and Autor (1999).6
Another strand of literature relevant for our notion of turbulence consists 
of studies of displaced workers. Early contributors such as Topel (1990), 
Ruhm (1991), and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) estimate that 
displaced U.S. workers suﬀer persistent earnings losses that range from 15 to 
30 percent, even ﬁ  ve years after displacement.7 Besides administrative data, 
5. Other studies have documented increased ﬁ  rm-  level volatility (see, e.g., Campbell et al. 
[2001] and Comin and Philippon [2005]). Davis et al. (2006) oﬀer a qualiﬁ  cation by showing that 
the increased volatility pertains to publicly traded ﬁ  rms, while the volatility among privately 
held ﬁ  rms, in contrast, has fallen signiﬁ  cantly since the 1980s and has almost converged to that 
among publicly traded ﬁ  rms.
6. In a recent study by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2007), Social Security records are 
shown to be consistent with earlier ﬁ  ndings that are based on publicly available survey data. 
The administrative records conﬁ  rm that workers have experienced substantial earnings vari-
ability, which has remained roughly constant between 1980 and 2003. Likewise, there is evidence 
that the earnings volatility increased for men between 1960 and 1980 (when computed for the 
bottom two quintiles of the earnings distribution, because recorded earnings in 1960 were 
truncated at the Social Security maximum taxable income, which was relatively low). However, 
the increase in earnings variability among men was oﬀset by a decrease among women. Note 
that if the latter observation reﬂ  ects a secular increase in the persistence of women’s labor 
force participation, it needs not contradict our hypothesis of increased turbulence between 
the 1960s and 1980s.
7. There are fewer studies available in Europe. But a common ﬁ  nding seems to be that both 
earnings losses and reemployment probabilities of displaced workers are smaller in Europe than 
in the United States. For Germany, Burda and Mertens (2001, 38) remark, “As only around 
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the most comprehensive source of information about the incidence and costs 
of job loss in the United States is the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), 
a biennial supplement to the Current Population Survey since 1984. (See 
Farber [1997, 2005] for summaries of DWS studies.) We acknowledge that 
the substantial earnings losses experienced by displaced U.S. workers since 
the 1980s by themselves say nothing about increased turbulence between the 
1950s and 1960s and the post-  1980s, as that would require evidence from 
similar displaced worker studies from the 1950s and 1960s, which unfor-
tunately do not exist. Perhaps the lack of interest among both academic 
researchers and the popular press suggests that worker displacements were 
less disruptive in those days, but this cannot be known without the histori-
cal data.
The central question is whether disruptive labor market experiences have 
become more common since the 1980s. Evidence that they have is provided 
by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), who document a substantial overall 
increase in occupational and industry mobility in the United States over the 
period from 1968 to 1997.8 Citing an earlier study by Rosenfeld (1979), who 
showed that occupational mobility was constant in the 1960s, Kambourov 
and Manovskii argue that a more turbulent economic environment is a phe-
nomenon of the last thirty years.
Our view that turbulence has increased since the late 1970s is not univer-
sally accepted; for example, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) oﬀer one 
skeptical voice.9 But others such as Heckman (2003) ﬁ  nd the evidence of 
increased turbulence persuasive, as summarized in his wide-  ranging talk at 
the 2003 Munich Economic Summit:
A growing body of evidence points to the fact that the world economy 
is more variable and less predictable today than it was 30 years ago. . . . 
[There is] more variability and unpredictability in economic life . . . 
(30– 31)
even 4 years afterwards, it seems that lower displacement wage losses in Germany come at the 
cost of lower reemployment probabilities.”
8. For another study that uses a diﬀerent technique but reaches the same conclusion that 
occupational and industry mobility has increased in the United States, see Parrado, Caner, 
and Wolﬀ (2007).
9. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, 46) used measures of sectoral reallocation when they 
asked and answered the question, “Has turbulence increased since the 1960s in a way that could 
help to explain increased unemployment? The answer is a clear no.” They computed the propor-
tions of jobs in each industry in adjacent years and then took the changes in each proportion. 
After summing the positive changes to get a measure of the proportion of employment switch-
ing industries, they found that turbulence had not increased enough to explain the emergence of 
high European unemployment. However, we think that their deﬁ  nition of turbulence is not the 
appropriate one from the perspective of individual workers. The restructuring of the U.S. steel 
industry in the 1980s can serve as an example. While the decline and subsequent recovery of that 
industry might have left a small imprint on measures of sectoral reallocation, the consequences 
for workers initially employed in that industry were dramatic. As studied by Shaw (2002), the 
restructuring led to new hiring standards that meant workers laid oﬀ at older, declining steel 
mills were not considered for employment at the newer steel mills.196        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
In our theoretical model, we deﬁ  ne an increase in turbulence as an increase 
in the probability that an involuntarily displaced worker loses human capi-
tal. We have used the microeconomic evidence of increased earnings vari-
ability and earnings losses of displaced workers described in Gottschalk and 
Moﬃtt (1994) and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), respectively, as 
checks on the realism of the model that we constructed to explain the mac-
roeconomic outcomes about inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows, durations, and levels of 
unemployment described in section 6.3.1. We report some results of these 
checks in section 6.5.4.
6.4      Extensions of the Basic Search Model for Analyzing Europe
To construct a theory of European unemployment, we again started from 
the basic McCall model, then added the following features:
1.  Age. A worker moves stochastically through four age groups, with tran-
sition probabilities calibrated to represent the following age groups: twenty 
to forty- ﬁ  ve, forty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty, ﬁ  fty to ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty. We use 
only four age groups to control the dimension of the state for an unemployed 
worker. We want to include age as a state variable, and we use a ﬁ  ner grid 
for older workers, because adverse welfare state dynamics that we describe 
later threaten to aﬀect older workers especially.
2.  Job termination and stochastic wages on the job. We retain the features 
from Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995a, 1995b) that a previously employed 
worker faces a probability   that the job ends exogenously, and his wage 
rate on the job evolves stochastically, with occasional new draws from the 
distribution F resulting in job upgrades or downgrades.
3.  Human capital or skills. We make earnings depend on a worker’s human 
capital or skills, and we let human capital appreciate when the worker is 
employed and depreciate gradually during spells of unemployment. Their 
levels of human capital diﬀerentiate workers. Unemployed workers set reser-
vation wages and search intensities that depend on their skill levels, because 
the option values of search and the rewards to more intensive search depend 
on skill.
We specify H potential skill levels, ordered from lowest to highest. We 
also specify two sets of transition probabilities that describe the motion over 
time of skills. One set of transition probabilities applies when a worker is 
employed and probabilistically impels skills upward. Another set of transi-
tion probabilities applies when a worker is unemployed and probabilistically 
causes skills to deteriorate.
We set a worker’s total earnings equal to the product of a base wage, 
drawn from the exogenous distribution F and the worker’s skills. During 
a spell of employment, a worker who starts from a low level of skills can 
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to the caveat that the base wage also might change on the job. The worker 
takes into account the likely growth of earnings in formulating his reserva-
tion wage and search intensity. The worker also takes into account the way 
unemployment compensation depends on past earnings.
4.  Earnings-  dependent unemployment compensation. The basic McCall 
model has a ﬁ  xed level of unemployment compensation that is independent 
of the worker’s earnings during his previous employment spell. To be more 
realistic, we modify this feature by linking unemployment compensation to 
earnings attained on the previous job. This substantially aﬀects the option 
value of search and makes it depend on the worker’s current skill level, 
the law of motion of those skills, and the worker’s previous earnings. How 
unemployment compensation alters this option value and its dependence on 
past earnings is an essential part of our analysis.
5.  Employment protection. To represent a government- mandated employ-
ment protection concisely, we impose a tax on all job destruction, except 
when a worker retires by exiting the highest age group and leaving the labor 
force.
6.  Representing economic turbulence. Our model contains two types of 
parameters that can be used in principle to represent labor market turbu-
lence: the ﬁ  ring or job dissolution parameter  , and parameters governing 
the rate at which human capital depreciates while unemployed. We choose 
to use one particular parameter from the latter set to measure turbulence; 
namely, a parameter that sets the one-  time depreciation in skill level that 
an employed worker experiences upon an exogenous job termination. In 
tranquil times, we let such a worker experience no immediate depreciation in 
human capital, but in turbulent times, we expose that worker to a risk that 
there is a one- time reduction in human capital. This is our way of capturing 
the disparity in skills used in diﬀerent jobs. In tranquil times, skills are more 
transferable across jobs than in turbulent times—turbulent times are ones 
with more rapidly changing job descriptions.
6.4.1      Consequences of the Additional Features
The modiﬁ  cations of the basic model alter the incentives that an unem-
ployed worker faces. An unemployed worker’s choices of search intensity 
and reservation wage depend on his skill level, his current entitlement to 
UI beneﬁ  ts—which in turn depend on his skill level at the time his pre-
vious job was terminated—and his age. Because his job may terminate, the 
unemployed worker takes into account not only his current unemployment 
compensation, which is linked to his past earnings, but also the fact that his 
future unemployment compensation will be linked to his future earnings, 
which in turn depends on his base wage and his human capital level. The 
present value of these future compensations depends on the worker’s age. 
Because his human capital level deteriorates with the passage of time spent 
unemployed, the worker will balance the beneﬁ  ts of waiting for a higher 198        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
base wage against the prospects of further deterioration of human capital 
while unemployed.
High unemployment compensation sets the following trap. Consider a 
worker who had relatively high earnings before he was dismissed and who 
therefore qualiﬁ  es for a high level of unemployment compensation. This per-
son’s reservation base wage and search intensity both depend on his human 
capital level. Early in a spell of unemployment, the worker searches inten-
sively and sets a reasonable reservation base wage, because his earnings are 
the product of that wage and the human capital level, and even for typical 
wages, the associated earnings compare favorably to unemployment com-
pensation. However, if the worker remains unemployed for a while and ﬁ  nds 
himself with a lower level of human capital, the incentives confronting him 
change adversely. His unemployment compensation remains high (because 
it is tied to his previous earnings), but for any given prospective draw from 
the base wage distribution, his earnings are lower because of his diminished 
human capital. Because the beneﬁ  ts of searching have declined relative to 
the compensation for remaining unemployed, the worker will tend to search 
less intensively and to set a higher reservation base wage. Both of these types 
of behavior will diminish the worker’s probability of leaving unemployment 
and will increase the mean duration of unemployment. The likelihood that 
a worker falls into this trap depends on his age, the risk being greater that 
an older worker will become discouraged from making the kinds of search 
intensity and wage acceptance choices that would be likely to return him to 
work soon.
Human capital acquisition can also provide a source of quits or voluntary 
separations. It can occur that a worker with low human capital accepts a 
lower base wage than one who has higher human capital. Having accepted 
a low base wage job but then experiencing growth in human capital, the 
worker can ﬁ  nd it optimal to quit his job and to search for a higher base 
wage to capitalize on his higher human capital.
The dynamics coming from human capital are too diﬃcult to work out 
analytically, but they can be worked out with the computer, which is what 
we have done in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008).
6.4.2      An Equilibrium as a System of Lakes and Streams
The search model is about the experiences of an individual worker as 
time and opportunities pass. We can use it as a building block to model the 
behavior of a large number of ex ante identical but ex post diverse work-
ers composing a complete labor market. The key step in building a model 
of the labor market is to reinterpret the search model’s individual descrip-
tive statistics—average duration of unemployment, average accepted wage, 
average times between incidents of quitting or being laid oﬀ—as applying 
to the average at any point in time of a large number of statistically identi-
cal individuals.How Sweden’s Unemployment Became More Like Europe’s    1 9 9
Imagine the labor market as a set of lakes connected by inlet and outlet 
streams (see ﬁ  gure 6.1). The volume of water in each lake represents the 
number of people in a particular labor market state (e.g., employed, unem-
ployed and having quit a previous job, unemployed and having been laid oﬀ 
from a previous job, unemployed because of having just entered the labor 
force), and the ﬂ  ows between lakes represent rates of hiring, laying oﬀ, and 
quitting. The system is in a stationary equilibrium when all lake levels are 
constant over time, which means that inﬂ  ows just balance outﬂ  ows for each 
lake. The rates of inﬂ  ow and outﬂ  ow are evidently the critical determinants 
of the lake levels. The individual search model lends itself to becoming a 
model of these inﬂ  ow and outﬂ  ow rates. For example, simply reinterpret the 
Fig. 6.1    Search model of the labor market
Note: The variables Ui and Ni refer to pools of unemployed and employed, respectively, where 
the subscript denotes the skill level of workers in a particular pool, with skills increasing in the 
index i.200        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
probability of job acceptance as determining the rate of ﬂ  ow from a state 
of unemployment to a state of employment.
Within such a model, government- supplied unemployment compensation 
gives rise to expenditures that must be ﬁ  nanced. In particular, the size of the 
unemployment lake (or lakes) determines the total volume of government 
unemployment compensation payments. We suppose that these are ﬁ  nanced 
from income taxes. In a stationary equilibrium, government expenditure rates 
and tax rates must be set so that the government budget balances.
6.4.3    Some  Parameters
We report some of the results for the calibrated versions of our model 
reported in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) for two types of economies: one 
that we call laissez-  faire (LF) and another that we call the welfare state 
(WS). The laissez-  faire economy has no UI and no EP. The welfare state 
economy has UI that is set to approximate a replacement ratio of 0.6 times 
earnings on the last job and layoﬀ tax that is set at what amounts to four-
teen weeks of the average productivity of all employed workers. We intend 
LF to represent a stylized version of the United States and WS to stand in 
for Europe.10 Other parameters are calibrated in ways that Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (2008) describe.
Unemployed workers draw base wages from the same truncated normal 
distribution with range [0, 1]. A worker’s skill level can assume one of eleven 
possible levels inside the range [1, 2], among which he moves according to 
calibrated transition matrices. To represent economic turbulence, we expose 
a newly involuntarily displaced worker to an instantaneous reduction in 
his human capital, modeled as a draw of a new skill level from a truncated 
left half of a normal distribution with speciﬁ  ed variance, where the right 
end point of the distribution is the displaced worker’s skill level in the latest 
period of employment just before being laid oﬀ. We use this speciﬁ  cation 
to study six diﬀerent degrees of economic turbulence (with the variance of 
the underlying normal distribution in parenthesis): T00 (variance 0), T03 
(variance 0.03), T05 (variance 0.05), T10 (variance 0.1), T20 (variance 0.2), 
and T99 (uniform distribution). Only during tranquil times (T00) does the 
10. While unemployment insurance is typically of limited duration, Layard, Nickell, and 
Jackman (1991) emphasize the fact that in Europe, further beneﬁ  ts are often available for an 
indeﬁ  nite period once unemployment compensation has been exhausted. For example, Hunt 
(1995) describes the German policy in 1983 when unemployment compensation (“Arbeitslosen-
geld”) replaced 68 percent of an unemployed worker’s previous earnings and could be col-
lected up to a maximum of twelve months. And if those beneﬁ  ts were exhausted, means- tested 
unemployment assistance (“Arbeitslosenhilfe”) paid a replacement rate of 58 percent for an 
indeﬁ  nite period. Although a cap was imposed on the amount that one could receive, it aﬀected 
less than 1 percent of the unemployed. For additional evidence on generous replacement rates 
and long beneﬁ  t durations in Europe, see Martin (1996). Regarding our assumption of costly 
layoﬀs in Europe, quantitative measurements are fraught with diﬃculties, but the account of 
Myers (1964) in note number 14 suggests a long-  standing diﬀerence between Europe and the 
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worker retain his skill level from the latest period of employment when laid 
oﬀ. In tables 6.2 and 6.3 (which we discuss later), we use these T labels to 
denote diﬀerent levels of turbulence.
6.5    Computational  Results
We have computed equilibria of our model under the WS and LF settings 
of government policy for diﬀerent settings of the turbulence parameter. But 
before examining the eﬀects of increased turbulence, we ﬁ  rst scrutinize equi-
librium outcomes in tranquil economic times when there is no turbulence.
6.5.1    Tranquil  Economic  Times
Table 6.1 displays the equilibria of the WS economy and the LF economy 
when there is no economic turbulence. The WS economy has signiﬁ  cantly 
lower unemployment than the LF economy because of a lower inﬂ  ow rate 
into unemployment, while the average duration of unemployment is similar 
across the two economies. As a result, lower unemployment in the WS econ-
omy is accompanied by much longer average job tenures than in the LF 
economy. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) explain these outcomes with the 
aid of a detailed analysis of decision rules for job destruction and a worker’s 
choice of his or her reservation wage and search intensity. We provide a brief 
summary as follows.
In tranquil times (denoted by an index of turbulence equal to T00), table 
6.2 shows that the layoﬀ cost in the WS economy is responsible for the lower 
unemployment rate. If the LF economy were to impose the same layoﬀ cost, 
it would have an even lower unemployment rate than the WS economy. The 
reason for layoﬀ costs being an eﬀective tool for holding down unemploy-
ment is simply that such costs make it expensive to lay oﬀ workers, and as 
a result, there is much less worker turnover in the economy. The lessened 
turnover translates into a lower rate of frictional unemployment. Thus, 
Table 6.1  Equilibrium values for the welfare state (WS) economy and the laissez- 
faire (LF) economy (under no economic turbulence)
      WS   LF  
Unemployment rate 3.83% 5.70%
Inﬂ  ow into unemployment per montha 2.06% 3.39%
Average unemployment durationb 7.73 weeks 7.13 weeks
Percentage of unemployed with spells 
so far   6 months
2.87% 1.73%
  Percentage of unemployed with spells 
so far   12 months
  0.08%   0.02%  
aThe monthly inﬂ  ow into unemployment is expressed as a percentage of employment.
bThe average unemployment duration is computed by dividing the unemployment rate by the 
inﬂ  ow rate, when both rates are expressed as percentages of the labor force.202        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
the analysis dispels a common argument that layoﬀ costs should increase 
unemployment because ﬁ  rms that anticipate the future payment of layoﬀ 
costs ﬁ  nd it too costly to hire workers, which should cause employment to 
fall. The problem with this argument is that it is partial equilibrium rather 
than general equilibrium in nature. The argument apparently treats the pay-
ment to a worker as a constant, while it is endogenous and changes in our 
general equilibrium analysis. In particular, payments to workers must adjust 
downward to restore ﬁ  rms’ proﬁ  tability in response to the introduction of 
layoﬀ costs. The lower payments to workers do not only reﬂ  ect the future 
payments of layoﬀ costs but also the fact that layoﬀ costs interfere with 
eﬃcient separations in the labor market; that is, layoﬀ costs give rise to a 
less eﬃcient allocation of labor in the economy. Hence, we can say that the 
workers in an economy with layoﬀ costs enjoy longer job tenures at the cost 
of a less eﬃcient allocation or that the workers pay for more job security 
with lower earnings.11
The government’s policy of paying unemployment beneﬁ  ts in the WS 
economy does increase unemployment relative to the LF economy. In table 
6.2, it can be seen that unemployment in the WS economy is higher for any 
level of turbulence and any level of layoﬀ costs relative to the corresponding 
entry for the LF economy. But it is important to understand why the upward 
pressure that the beneﬁ  t system exerts on unemployment in the WS economy 
Table 6.2  Unemployment eﬀects of layoﬀ costs with diﬀerent degrees of 
economic turbulence




0   5   10 0   5   10
Turbulence
 T00 5.85 4.77 3.83 5.70 4.43 3.51
 T03 5.65 4.74 4.18 5.24 4.14 3.23
 T05 5.76 5.03 5.06 5.18 4.06 3.16
 T10 6.01 5.92 6.75 5.11 4.03 3.19
 T20 6.31 7.00 8.76 5.07 4.00 3.19
 T99   6.60  8.08  10.95   5.02  3.98  3.24
Note: Tranquil times have an index of turbulence equal to T00.
aA layoﬀ tax of 5 (10) corresponds to roughly seven (fourteen) weeks of the average productiv-
ity of all employed workers.
11. The outcome that layoﬀ costs reduce equilibrium unemployment is not unique to our 
analysis. Despite countervailing forces in search and matching models, Ljungqvist (2002) shows 
that there is a quantitative presumption that layoﬀ costs reduce unemployment in these models 
of frictional unemployment. Exceptions in the literature, notably of Millard and Mortensen 
(1997), arrive at the opposite conclusion by making the nonstandard assumption that ﬁ  rms 
incur layoﬀ costs not only when laying oﬀ workers but also after encounters with job seekers 
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is not strong enough to overwhelm the downward pressure from layoﬀ costs 
in tranquil times; that is, the WS unemployment rate is lower than the LF 
unemployment rate in table 6.1. The reason is that in tranquil times, workers 
do not incur any immediate skill losses at the time of layoﬀs, and hence, they 
can search for new job opportunities with pay comparable to their last earn-
ings. So, while unemployment beneﬁ  ts do make unemployed workers search 
a little less diligently than they otherwise would, they are still relatively eager 
to recoup their full earnings potential in the market place rather than to col-
lect beneﬁ  ts that amount to 60 percent of their last earnings.
It is instructive to take a closer look at an unemployed worker’s decision 
rule for the choice of a reservation base wage (per unit of skill), as deﬁ  ned 
in section 6.4. The arguments entering the decision rule are the state vari-
ables that describe circumstances relevant for making an optimal decision: 
the worker’s age, last earnings, and current skills. The age determines the 
worker’s time left in the labor force, last earnings determine the beneﬁ  ts 
to which he or she is entitled, and current skills determine his or her earn-
ings potential. Recall that the earnings in a new job is the product of the 
worker’s skills and the base wage that he or she draws from the wage oﬀer 
distribution. As an illustration, ﬁ  gure 6.2 depicts the reservation base wage 
of workers in the group aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty as a function of their last 
earnings and current skills. For example, consider a recently laid- oﬀ worker 
who has high last earnings, which would indicate that this worker is likely 
to have attained a high skill level in his last job. Such a worker also should 
have high current skills, because layoﬀs in tranquil times are not associated 
with any instantaneous loss of skills. Our argument implies that recently 
laid- oﬀ workers are likely to be found on a diagonal in ﬁ  gure 6.2, with a 
positive relationship between last earnings and current skills. It is interest-
ing to note that the reservation base wage lies on an almost ﬂ  at plateau 
for these unemployed workers—a plateau that extends below the diagonal, 
where lower last earnings mean less generous beneﬁ  ts. It follows that all these 
workers with similar reservation wages will ﬁ  nd jobs at similar rates, and the 
implied average duration of unemployment spells turns out be close to that 
of the LF economy (as also reported for the aggregates of all unemployed 
in table 6.1). In this sense, we can say that the workers in the WS economy 
have reasonable wage demands.
We ﬁ nd an important hint about what will happen in the WS economy 
in turbulent times in ﬁ  gure 6.2. Workers who experience instantaneous skill 
losses upon layoﬀs will be positioned above the described diagonal, where 
their beneﬁ  ts are high because of high last earnings, while their current 
earnings potentials are low because of low current skills. Figure 6.2 sug-
gests that these skill losers will choose much higher reservation wages; that 
is, before giving up their generous beneﬁ  ts, they want to ﬁ  nd jobs that pay 
very well per unit of remaining skills. Furthermore, it turns out that because 
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it less costly to remain unemployed, an unemployed worker in these circum-
stances invests less in search by choosing a relatively low search intensity. 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) show that these adverse incentive eﬀects of 
generous beneﬁ  ts are most pronounced for the highest age group, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty.
Fortunately, in tranquil economic times, it turns out that there are hardly 
any unemployed workers with low skills who are entitled to high beneﬁ  ts 
based on high last earnings, so the WS economy sustains a low equilibrium 
unemployment rate in table 6.1.
6.5.2    Turbulent  Economic  Times
When we increase the turbulence parameter in table 6.3, the WS economy 
posts an ever higher unemployment rate, while unemployment is practically 
ﬂ  at (with some drift downward) in the LF economy. The emergence of high, 
long- term unemployment in the WS economy is due both to generous unem-
ployment beneﬁ  ts and to high layoﬀ costs.
The decision rules of unemployed workers in turbulent economic times 
are qualitatively the same as in times of tranquility. But the adverse incen-
tive eﬀects of unemployment compensation in the WS economy are exacer-
Fig. 6.2    Reservation base wage of the unemployed in age group ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty 
who are eligible for unemployment compensation in the WS economy (under tranquil 
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bated in turbulent times, because there are now laid-  oﬀ workers who suﬀer 
signiﬁ  cant amounts of instantaneous skill loss, and they will choose high 
reservation wages (as suggested by the decision rule depicted in ﬁ  gure 6.2). 
Because these workers’ depreciated skill levels are low relative to their recent 
earnings history, their unemployment beneﬁ  ts, based as they are on their 
high previous earnings, are very attractive when compared to their current 
labor market prospects. Therefore, these workers demand a high wage per 
unit of remaining skill before they are willing to give up those generous ben-
eﬁ  ts. Moreover, such high wages are hard to come by, so workers under these 
circumstances tend to become discouraged and to choose low search inten-
sities. Older laid-  oﬀ workers have a shorter horizon until retirement and 
therefore less time for any accumulation of new skills, so they are choosier 
than younger workers before accepting a job and giving up their beneﬁ  ts. 
These adverse incentive dynamics are absent from the LF economy, because 
past earnings are not a state variable for unemployed workers. Therefore, any 
laid- oﬀ worker in the LF economy who experiences an instantaneous skill 
loss will immediately adjust to the new situation and will search diligently 
for a suitable job, given the change in circumstances.
We now brieﬂ  y examine the eﬀects of layoﬀ costs in the WS economy. 
Ljungqvist (2002) showed that in a search model like ours, higher layoﬀ 
costs lower the unemployment rate by reducing frictional unemployment. 
Table 6.3  Equilibrium values for the WS economy and the LF economy with 
diﬀerent degrees of economic turbulence
Index of economic turbulencea
      T00   T03   T05   T10   T20   T99  
Unemployment rate (%)
WS 3.83 4.18 5.06 6.75 8.76 10.95
LF 5.70 5.24 5.18 5.11 5.07 5.02
Inﬂ  ow into unemploymentb (% per month)
WS 2.06 2.05 2.03 2.00 1.99 1.97
LF 3.39 3.33 3.30 3.27 3.25 3.23
Average duration of unemploymentc (in weeks)
WS 7.73 8.53 10.52 14.47 19.34 25.00
LF 7.13 6.64 6.63 6.59 6.57 6.56
Percentage of unemployed with spells so far   12 months
WS 0.08 9.67 23.53 41.10 54.14 62.64
   LF   0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
aA higher index of economic turbulence is associated with a higher variance of skill losses at 
layoﬀs.
bThe monthly inﬂ  ow into unemployment is expressed as a percentage of employment.
cThe average unemployment duration is computed by dividing the unemployment rate by the 
inﬂ  ow rate, when both rates are expressed as percentages of the labor force.206        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
However, table 6.2 shows that in turbulent times, the eﬀect is reversed in 
the WS economy, because in turbulent times, unemployment has both fric-
tional and structural components. The structural component contains the 
long-  term unemployed who have chosen to become less active in the labor 
market. In turbulent times, when agents think about withdrawing from the 
labor market, both the higher turbulence and the higher layoﬀ cost make 
labor market participation less attractive by reducing the equilibrium wage. 
But in the absence of generous beneﬁ  ts, not participating in the labor market 
is not a viable option. In fact, the negative relationship between layoﬀ costs 
and unemployment is a robust feature in the LF economy, even in the face of 
variations in the degree of economic turbulence, as shown in table 6.2 (even 
though it isn’t such a robust feature of the WS economy).
6.5.3      Summary of Macroeconomic Findings
Interactions among employment protection (EP), unemployment insur-
ance (UI), and turbulence constitute the smoking gun that solves the puzzle 
summarized in the epigraph from Krugman. With our calibration, in tran-
quil times, most unemployment is frictional, in the sense that it consists of 
workers who are actively searching and who expect to ﬁ  nd new jobs quickly. 
In tranquil times, there is little structural unemployment consisting of dis-
couraged workers who have already been unemployed for a long time and 
who do not expect to ﬁ  nd jobs soon. The imposition of strong EP serves to 
suppress frictional unemployment by reducing the inﬂ  ow of workers into 
unemployment, thereby lengthening the durations of existing jobs by reduc-
ing churning.
Strong EP also reduces frictional unemployment in turbulent times, but 
now frictional unemployment is not the main problem. In turbulent times, 
the adverse welfare state dynamics coming from generous UI indexed to past 
earnings trap a signiﬁ  cant minority of workers who have experienced skill 
losses into structural unemployment. The frictional unemployment ﬁ  ghting 
tool of EP does nothing to encourage the discouraged workers who have 
been unemployed for a long time.
This is our explanation for how generous UI beneﬁ  ts led to benign out-
comes under a low-  turbulence environment but contributed to forming 
pools of discouraged workers, especially among older workers, when times 
became turbulent.
6.5.4      Implications about Earnings Heterogeneity
So far, we have described the implications that our way of introducing 
increased turbulence has for equilibrium aggregate outcomes within the WS 
and LF regimes. But the computations used to obtain those results contain a 
rich set of implications about the ex post heterogenous workers who inhabit 
the various versions of the model. We can form artiﬁ  cial panels of these 
workers and apply to them the same procedures that microeconomists used 
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in section 6.3.2. This is an independent check on our calibration of the 
turbulence parameter and other parameters of the model, because those 
microeconomic observations were not among the targets that we used to 
calibrate the model. It is encouraging to us that by using our model in this 
way, we have been able to replicate important aspects of earnings dynamics 
described by Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) and Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993). We describe that exercise in detail in Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(2008) and summarize it brieﬂ  y here.
Using the LF economy with economic turbulence indexed by T10 and 
T20, we generate artiﬁ  cial versions of Gottschalk and Moﬃtt’s Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) panels for 1970 to 1978 and 1979 to 1987, 
respectively. As our counterparts to their ﬁ  gures 2 and 4 (reproduced here 
in our ﬁ  gure 6.3 [panels A and B]), we arrive at ﬁ  gure 6.4 (panels A and 
B) after applying their method for decomposing each panel’s earnings into 
permanent and transitory components. Evidently, an increase in our tur-
bulence parameter spreads the distributions of both components of the 
Gottschalk- Moﬃtt decomposition in the direction observed. However, 
there are diﬀerences in the ranges of the distributions. The fact that our 
distribution of permanent earnings in ﬁ  gure 6.4 (panel A) spans a smaller 
range than the Gottschalk-  Moﬃtt data is not surprising. Our artiﬁ  cial 
panel contains a group of homogeneous individuals who are ex ante iden-
tical, while the PSID used by Gottschalk and Moﬃtt comprises a diverse 
group of American males with diﬀerent educational backgrounds. It is also 
noteworthy that the increased earnings variability in the more turbulent 
period in our ﬁ  gure 6.4 (panel B) occurs at lower standard deviations than 
Gottschalk and Moﬃtt’s. In this respect, the increase in economic turbulence 
in our parameterization for the 1980s falls short of the changes documented 
for the United States.
Fig. 6.3    Reproduction of Gottschalk and Moﬃtt’s (1994) ﬁ  gure 2 (panel a) and 
ﬁ  gure 4 (panel b)
Note: The black bars correspond to 1970 to 1978, the white bars to 1979 to 1987.208        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
As reported here in our ﬁ  gure 6.5, our ﬁ  gure 6.6 reproduces ﬁ  gure 1 of 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). It shows earnings losses experi-
enced by displaced workers in Pennsylvania in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1982. Using 
artiﬁ  cial data from the LF economy with economic turbulence indexed by 
T20, we produce a counterpart of their graph in ﬁ  gure 6.6. The surprisingly 
good ﬁ  t here is obtained for our subsample of separators who have experi-
enced skill losses of at least 30 percent. These separators constitute roughly 
one-  third of all separators in our artiﬁ  cial data set.
6.6    Recent  Swedish  Outcomes
An essential question as posed by Lindbeck et al. (1994) was whether 
Sweden had succeeded in permanently setting itself apart from Europe start-
ing in the 1980s, when the Swedish unemployment rate remained low, while 
Europe experienced sustained higher unemployment. Was the episode in the 
early 1990s in Sweden only a temporary departure from Sweden’s exception-
ally low unemployment rate? Or, was the higher Swedish unemployment 
rate in the early 1990s the start of a reversion of Sweden’s unemployment 
rate to a permanent level more typical of most other Western European 
countries?
We answered this question by using a particular theory of the European 
unemployment experience. We constructed a model that attributes the his-
torically low European unemployment rates to welfare state institutions that 
tend to suppress frictional unemployment, such as employment protection. 
This part of our theory aligns well with our earlier analysis of the Swedish 
unemployment experience, and after adding the system of monitoring the 
unemployed in Sweden, our theory can rationalize why unemployment until 
Fig. 6.4    Simulated laissez-  faire economy
Note: The black bars and the white bars correspond to degrees of economic turbulence in-
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Fig. 6.5    Quarterly earnings of high-  attachment workers separating in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 1982 and workers staying through 1986
Note: The solid line refers to stayers, the dashed line to separators. This is a reproduction of 
ﬁ  gure 1 in Jacobson et al. (1993), omitting their last observation because it was based on an 
insuﬃcient sample.
the 1970s was lower in Europe, and especially in Sweden, as compared to 
the United States. Next, our theory attributes the outbreak of persistently 
higher unemployment in Europe in the 1980s to generous unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts in times of microeconomic turbulence that increase the volatility 
of individual workers’ earnings prospects. We allege that such turbulence 
is driven by worldwide developments such as new information technologies 
and competitive pressures coming from globalization. So, how has Sweden 
fared in this context?
Recent economic events that are unfolding in Sweden have made it clear 
that the national economy has changed and that repercussions from the 
global marketplace are greater than ever. As an example, the restructuring 
of the global automobile industry has reached Sweden with far-  reaching 
implications for its former domestically owned car makes, Volvo and SAAB, 
and their many local subcontractors. Edling (2005) uses this restructuring 
of the automobile industry to support his argument that the increased spe-
cialization associated with the new global economy is here to stay and that it 
necessitates a more adaptive Swedish labor force in which individual workers 
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To illustrate further the loss of Swedish innocence in the new global mar-
ket economy, consider the changing fortunes of another heirloom in the 
Swedish economy—Ericsson, an international supplier of telecommuni-
cations. The company lost considerable public goodwill in 1997 because 
of cost-  cutting measures that involved mass layoﬀs in the Swedish city 
Norrköping. In a public speech that year, the party secretary of the gov-
erning Social Democratic Party suggested that Swedish consumers should 
consider boycotting the company’s mobile phones because of its apparent 
disregard for workers’ welfare (Dagens Nyheter 1997). It was not a domes-
tic boycott but rather a weakening international demand for its mobile 
phones, and ultimately worldwide diﬃculties in the telecommunications 
industry, that threatened Ericsson’s survival as an independent company. 
Compared to the high that its share price attained in 2000, the value of 
the company’s equity had tumbled more than 98 percent two years later 
Fig. 6.6    Simulated quarterly earnings of high-  attachment workers separating in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1982 with skill losses exceeding 30 percent and workers staying 
through 1986
Note: The solid line refers to stayers, the dashed line to separators. The simulation is based on 
the LF economy, with economic turbulence indexed by T20. The earnings numbers are multi-
plied by a factor of 700 to facilitate comparison with the empirical study by Jacobson et al. 
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(Ericsson 2005). Since then, Ericsson has regained ground in an intensively 
competitive international industry, and its comeback in mobile phones 
has ﬁ  ttingly been undertaken as a joint venture with the large Japanese 
company SONY.
What has happened to Swedish unemployment in this new economy?
6.6.1      Two Views of Swedish Unemployment
The lower solid line in ﬁ  gure 6.7 represents the oﬃcial Swedish unemploy-
ment rate that excludes participants in labor market programs. The unem-
ployment rate explodes during the economic crisis in 1992/ 1993 and remains 
high for a few years before starting to come down at the end of the 1990s. 
Since then, unemployment seems to have settled down to a somewhat higher 
level than the historically low Swedish unemployment rate.
The lower dashed line is the unemployment rate when participants in 
labor market programs are also included in the ranks of unemployed.12 The 
diﬀerence between the lower dashed line and the lower solid line is fairly 
constant, with less than 2 percentage points of the labor force in labor mar-
ket programs at any point in time. An exception occurred in the 1990s, when 
the economic crisis caused enrollment in labor market programs to increase. 
Since then, enrollment apparently has returned to precrisis levels.
Edling (2005, 41) oﬀers a diﬀerent view of Swedish unemployment by 
asking whether “unemployment is hidden in accounts other than those origi-
nally intended for the unemployed.” Edling documents that the numbers 
of early retirees and the long-  term sick in diﬀerent geographic regions in 
Sweden seem to vary with labor market conditions in those regions. The cor-
relation between unemployment and early retirement in local municipalities 
is especially strong for the older labor force in the group aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to 
sixty- four. Edling concludes that early retirement to a large extent is used as 
a measure for labor market policy rather than only for its original purpose 
of providing insurance against disability.
To impart a time dimension to Edling’s argument, we make the follow-
ing calculations. After summing up all the employed, unemployed includ-
ing labor market program participants, and early retirees in the year 1963, 
we estimate that the early retirees made up 3.5 percent of that base. For 
now, suppose that this fraction constitutes the true fraction of disabled 
workers in the labor force in 1963 and in all subsequent years. Under this 
12. Participants in labor market programs are involved in (a) subsidized employment, (b) 
education, or (c) work practice. The ﬁ  rst group is counted as employed when computing the 
oﬃcial unemployment rate, represented by the lower solid line in ﬁ  gure 6.7, while the lat-
ter two groups are completely left out from the labor force. Hence, starting from the oﬃcial 
unemployment rate, the unemployment rate that includes labor market program participants, 
represented by the lower dashed line in ﬁ  gure 6.7, is computed by transferring the ﬁ  rst group 
of program participants from employment to unemployment and by adding the latter two 
groups that are involved in education and work practice to both the labor force and the ranks 
of the unemployed.212        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
maintained assumption that 3.5 percent are truly disabled in every year, we 
can ask what has been an adjusted Swedish unemployment rate in the period 
from 1963 to 2004 after adding to the number of unemployed the excessive 
enrollment in early retirement. The upper solid line in ﬁ  gure 6.7 depicts 
our answer.
Using sickness insurance data available from 1974, we can make a similar 
adjustment to the unemployment rate for the number of long-  term sick; 
that is, those who have received sickness insurance beneﬁ  ts for more than 
one year. The long-  term sick can be found both in the labor force and out 
of the labor force. As a ﬁ  rst approximation, if we assume that all long-  term 
sick have employment, we ﬁ  nd that in 1974, there was 0.5 percent long- term 
Fig. 6.7    Measures of Swedish unemployment
Sources: Openly unemployed (yearly average): Labor Force Survey, Statistics Sweden (AKU, 
SCB); participants in labor market programs (yearly average): National Labor Market Board 
(AMS); early retirees and long-  term sick (in December): Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
(Försäkringskassan).
Note: The lower solid line is the oﬃcial unemployment rate, and the lower dashed line is the 
unemployment rate after adding participants in labor market programs. The upper solid line 
is an adjustment of the latter unemployment rate that includes also excessive enrollment in 
early retirement, deﬁ  ned as early retirees in excess of the fraction of early retirement that 
prevailed in the year 1963 (i.e., 3.5 percent of the labor force). The upper dashed line is yet 
another adjustment of the unemployment rate that adds the excessive number of long-  term 
sick who have received beneﬁ  ts for more than a year, deﬁ  ned as long-  term sick in excess of the 
fraction of long-  term sick in year 1974 (i.e., 0.5 percent of the labor force).How Sweden’s Unemployment Became More Like Europe’s    2 1 3
sick out of the previous base. Under the assumption that 0.5 percent are 
truly long-  term sick in every year, we can ask how the previous adjusted 
unemployment rate would look like in the period from 1974 to 2004 if we 
add the excessive number of long- term sick. The upper dashed line in ﬁ  gure 
6.7 depicts this adjusted unemployment rate that includes both early retirees 
and long-  term sick in excess of their fractions prevailing in 1963 and 1974, 
respectively.
Our alternative measure of unemployment conveys a very diﬀerent pic-
ture of Swedish unemployment than the oﬃcial measure, represented by 
the lower solid line in ﬁ  gure 6.7. According to the alternative measure in the 
upper dashed line, Sweden’s unemployment has indeed become more like 
Europe’s since the beginning of the 1990s. But instead of classifying the 
long- term unemployed as unemployed, Sweden has relabeled many of them 
as early retirees and long-  term sick. Admittedly, unemployment rates in 
general would have to be adjusted upward to reﬂ  ect hidden unemployment 
in social welfare programs other than unemployment insurance.13 In any 
case, when the activity of unemployment is properly measured, the fear of 
Lindbeck et al. (1994) that there would become a large group of permanently 
unemployed citizens in Sweden seems to have been realized.
6.6.2      Swedish Outcomes through the Camera of Our Model
Some observers of the Swedish economy might argue that turbulence is 
nothing new, because in the 1960s, there were large migratory ﬂ  ows from 
the northern to the southern parts of the country, as well as an acceler-
ated urbanization. But such restructuring of the economy is not necessar-
ily associated with the kind of turbulence described in our theory. In fact, 
workers in the 1960s were moving to regions where expanding industries in 
the manufacturing sector oﬀered better-  paying jobs than could be found 
where they came from. Hence, the circumstances in the 1960s were actually 
the opposite to our theory of negative shocks to individual workers’ earn-
ings potentials.
13. Autor and Duggan (2003) argue that reduced screening stringency since 1984 and rising 
replacement rates of the disability insurance program in the United States have led to a higher 
propensity of workers facing adverse shocks to exit the labor force to seek disability beneﬁ  ts. 
Because of the progressive (i.e., concave) beneﬁ  t formula, they ﬁ  nd that these incentive eﬀects 
apply foremost to high school dropouts who have also experienced adverse demand shifts for 
their skills in recent decades. Autor and Duggan suggest that the measured unemployment rate 
in the United States would be about half a percentage point higher if the excessive enrollment 
in the disability insurance program were to be included. Hence, their reasoning is qualitatively 
the same as our argument for Sweden, but the magnitudes are diﬀerent. According to Autor 
and Duggan, 3.7 percent of Americans aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four received disability insur-
ance beneﬁ  ts in 2001, while Edling (2005) reports that for the Swedish population aged twenty 
to sixty- four, early retirees comprised 10 percent in 2004, and another 2.4 percent had received 
sickness insurance beneﬁ  ts for more than a year in 2003. For further evidence on signiﬁ  cant 
increases in early retirement and enrollments in disability insurance programs in several Euro-
pean countries since the 1980s, see the country studies compiled by Gruber and Wise (2004).214        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
Other observers of Sweden might argue for alternative theories that at-
tribute current unemployment problems to the macroeconomic shock of the 
early 1990s. A similar reason that has been oﬀered for the European unem-
ployment dilemma has been that the oil price shocks of the 1970s served as 
the catalyst for high European unemployment. But as time has gone by, that 
view has become less and less tenable, because the transient response to that 
shock should not have lasted so long. Likewise, our theory suggests that the 
high incidence of long- term unemployment and early retirement in Sweden 
of today has little do with the macroeconomic shock of the early 1990s.
An open question is why Sweden seemed to have been spared the Euro-
pean unemployment problem until the 1990s. One also could ask why Bel-
gium was the ﬁ  rst country to experience the problem of long-  term unem-
ployment as early as the 1960s (see Sinﬁ  eld [1968]). This is not puzzling in 
the light of our theory and for the fact that there was an economic upheaval 
in Belgium with massive layoﬀs in mining and a faltering steel industry. In 
hindsight, the Belgian experience signaled what the future had in store for 
the rest of Europe.
Our analysis raises concerns about Swedish labor markets that were not 
present in our earlier analysis (Ljungqvist and Sargent 1997), where we pro-
ceeded under the assumption that macroeconomic shocks had given rise to 
an increase in the Swedish unemployment rate in the early 1990s, which was 
exogenous to our model. The implication of our earlier model was that Swe-
den could revert to its historically low unemployment rate if the government 
could restore its monitoring of unemployed workers and make them accept 
suitable wage oﬀers. Our present analysis that attributes high European 
unemployment to increased turbulence complicates the policy problem: 
what constitute suitable wage oﬀers now depends on shocks to individual 
workers’ earnings potentials that cannot be veriﬁ  ed easily by unemployment 
agencies, making it likely that beneﬁ  t levels become misaligned relative to 
those unobserved diminished earnings potentials.
Wages serve as signals that induce workers to ﬁ  nd jobs that value their 
skills highly. Markets award pay increases when workers’ skills increase but 
also make workers accept pay reductions when their skills become economi-
cally obsolete. Generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts do not interfere with the 
former but make the latter more diﬃcult. A worker who has experienced 
adverse labor market conditions might have to leave a long-  tenure job and 
seek employment in a new industry where the pay is lower and where valu-
able skills must be reconstructed. Needless to say, such transitions are espe-
cially diﬃcult for older workers who have shorter horizons and therefore 
have less time to accumulate skills. The challenge of a welfare state with 
generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts is to provide incentives to workers who 
have experienced adverse labor market conditions to return to employment. 
Questions about incentives in social insurance systems are now common in 
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6.7    Concluding  Remarks
In this second generation of the Center for Business and Policy Studies-
  National Bureau of Economic Research (SNS-  NBER) project, we have 
extended our analysis of the Swedish unemployment experience in a model 
that extends our earlier framework. We have widened our inquiry to con-
trast the experience of Sweden, in particular, and of European welfare 
states, in general, to outcomes in a more laissez-  faire economy like that 
of the United States. Our research strategy has remained one of identify-
ing and analyzing institutions and factors that tend either to decrease or 
to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate in a welfare state relative 
to that of a laissez-  faire economy. Among welfare state institutions that 
tend to decrease equilibrium unemployment in tranquil economic times, our 
analysis focuses on employment protection that makes it costly for ﬁ  rms to 
lay oﬀ workers. Because government- mandated employment protection has 
been much stronger in Europe since World War II, our model can explain 
why unemployment rates in the 1950s and 1960s were systematically lower 
in Europe than in the United States.14 The lower rates of inﬂ  ow into unem-
ployment in Europe are consistent with this prediction, because employ-
ment protection reduces churning of workers in the labor market and locks 
workers into their current employment. The result is a reduction in fric-
tional unemployment in tranquil economic times that allows transferability 
of workers’ skills between jobs. The ease with which unemployed workers 
can ﬁ  nd jobs, comparing favorable ones in pay and other beneﬁ  ts, ensures 
that the average duration of unemployment spells remains low in a welfare 
state, despite generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts, as in Europe in the 1950s 
and 1960s.
Concerning the outbreak of high European unemployment after the late 
1970s, our analysis starts from microeconomic evidence that labor market 
prospects facing workers have become more variable and less predictable. 
Our model explains why such turbulent times should cause unemployment 
to increase in welfare states with generous beneﬁ  ts; our model also says 
that increase should take the form of long- term unemployment—structural 
unemployment—with an especially high incidence among older workers. 
14. Our explanation mirrors the insight developed by Myers (1964, 180–  1), Deputy Com-
missioner at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, when thinking about possible reasons for the 
low European unemployment rate in the 1950s and 1960s: “One of the diﬀerences [between the 
United States and Europe] lies in our attitude toward layoﬀs. The typical American employer is 
not indiﬀerent to the welfare of his work force, but his relationship to his workers is often rather 
impersonal. The interests of his own employers, the stockholders, tend to make him extremely 
sensitive to proﬁ  ts and to costs. When business falls oﬀ, he soon begins to think of reduction 
in force. . . . In many other industrial countries, speciﬁ  c laws, collective agreements, or vigorous 
public opinion protect the workers against layoﬀs except under the most critical circumstances. 
Despite falling demand, the employer counts on retraining his permanent employees. He is 
obliged to ﬁ  nd work for them to do. . . . These arrangements are certainly eﬀective in holding 
down unemployment.”216        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
Notwithstanding the apparent delay in the onset of these adverse welfare 
dynamics in Sweden, we argue that the analysis also pertains to Sweden, 
where the growing numbers of long-  term unemployed and early retirees 
should be a source of major concern.
Our analysis attributes the unemployment problems of Europe, in general, 
and of Sweden, in particular, to the adverse incentive eﬀects in a welfare state 
when workers encounter unfavorable developments in the labor market. 
While we have modeled those unfavorable developments as negative shocks 
to laid-  oﬀ workers’ earning potentials, it is important to keep in mind that 
workers’ job opportunities can also deteriorate in other ways because of 
the multidimensional character of employment. Thus, the dilemma of the 
welfare state becomes the question of how to increase job acceptance rates 
among workers who have encountered unfavorable labor market conditions 
in one way or another and who are entitled to generous beneﬁ  ts while staying 
unemployed. Although it is outside the scope of our chapter to suggest a 
solution to this dilemma, it is useful to comment on various proposals from 
the perspective of our theoretical framework. Many of the proposals fall 
within one of two categories: (a) measures that attempt to increase the return 
to work, and (b) measures that reduce the return to being unemployed.
6.7.1      Proposals for Reducing Unemployment in the Lens of Our Model
If government programs for retraining had proved eﬀective in raising 
the marketable skills of the unemployed, they could be a potent measure 
for reducing unemployment in our model. But the accumulated empirical 
evidence on the returns to government-  arranged retraining programs is not 
promising. The latest major initiative in Sweden, called the “Knowledge 
Lift,” does not seem to have been an exception. Albrecht, van den Berg, and 
Vroman (2004) provide an evaluation of this massive program: in the period 
from 1997 to 2000, more than 10 percent of the labor force had participated 
in it. While the study detects a positive employment eﬀect for young men, 
it ﬁ  nds no evidence of an income eﬀect from the program, and hence, older 
men and the average female participant seemed to have fared no better than 
nonparticipants. For a further discussion and a summary of studies ﬁ  nding 
at most minor eﬀects of labor market programs, see Forslund and Krue-
ger (chapter 5 in this volume). Our model embodies a stark version of this 
empirical evidence by assigning no role to public expenditures on retraining 
and relief jobs. In our model, displaced workers who incur losses of earn-
ings potential are left to seek employment opportunities where new skills 
can be accumulated. Our model incorporates an empirically based skepti-
cism about government-  mandated programs and abstracts from initiatives 
by individual workers who acquire formal education in response to perceived 
market opportunities.
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to subsidize employment of long- term unemployed workers. Such measures 
would certainly reduce unemployment in our model, because the subsidies 
would come on top of the return to the workers’ marketable skills, and 
because in a competitive labor market, the subsidies would be reﬂ  ected in 
workers’ pay. Hence, a policy-  induced artiﬁ  cial increase in workers’ earn-
ings potentials would motivate them to search more intensively and to be 
more willing to accept new employment. We have two doubts about targeted 
employment subsidies. First, there would be incentives for both ﬁ  rms and 
workers to try to qualify for these temporary subsidies. Such behavioral 
responses are well known for policies that attempt to single out and subsidize 
some marginal actions like new hires by ﬁ  rms. Second, the risk that subsidies 
distort competition in the marketplace is always a concern. An illustration 
of the latter would be a case where an unemployed worker gets a subsidy to 
cover some of his or her pay when opening a new coﬀee house. Needless to 
say, existing coﬀee houses in the same community would be at a disadvan-
tage in the competition with the new subsidized entrant. Therefore, as an 
alternative to targeted subsidies, one might want to consider measures aimed 
at improving the return to work for low- income workers, in general, such as 
recent proposals to reduce taxes at lower-  income levels. Such labor supply 
inducements for low- income workers necessarily would be more costly than 
targeted employment subsidies, but they could also be seen as serving the 
overall workfare goal espoused by Björklund and Freeman (chapter 1 in 
this volume).
A reduction in beneﬁ  t levels is the most obvious measure that reduces the 
return to being unemployed, and it clearly would reduce unemployment in 
our model. However, proposals prescribing beneﬁ  t reductions for the long-
 term unemployed have been criticized for abandoning the European welfare 
model and for advocating a stinginess resembling that of social insurance 
systems in the United States. It is probably safe to say that there is a strong 
European sentiment that the low beneﬁ  t levels for the long- term unemployed 
in the United States would not be acceptable in Europe. The question then 
becomes how to reform the unemployment insurance system so that it pro-
vides proper incentives while preserving the social fabric of Europe. After 
recognizing that the task is to reduce the return to being unemployed relative 
to being employed, one shortcoming of our model stands out—the value 
of leisure enters only in the workers’ decision to search for jobs, whereby 
a choice of higher search intensity is associated with exerting more eﬀort; 
that is, a loss of leisure. The model incorporates no disutility of working 
relative to the enjoyment of leisure while not working. If this feature were 
to be added to our model, proposals to reduce the return to being unem-
ployed would not necessarily have to take the form of reduced beneﬁ  ts but 
could also be accomplished by reducing the amount of leisure available to 
the unemployed.218        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
Requiring that the long-  term unemployed perform social work com-
mensurate to the number of hours in a regular full-  time job could mark-
edly reduce the return to unemployment compared to employment.15 If the 
states of unemployment and employment are not that diﬀerent in terms of 
hours devoted to either social work or regular work, unemployment ben-
eﬁ  ts would become much less attractive when compared to earning a wage 
in the marketplace. In addition to providing incentives for the unemployed 
to return to regular employment, social work requirements would address 
concerns about the mental health of the unemployed. Jahoda (1982) identi-
ﬁ  es a number of psychological beneﬁ  ts from working, including the joy of 
participating in useful social activities and the daily structure that regular 
activities provide. Apart from the economic hardship of being unemployed, 
Nordenmark and Strandh (1999) document from a longitudinal survey of 
unemployed Swedes that a standard measure of poor mental health is cor-
related with the extent to which individuals feel socially deprived by not 
having a job. It seems that unemployed workers “who have, or manage to 
ﬁ  nd, alternative roles and identities to the role of employee fare quite well” 
(583). In this perspective, social work requirements would aid those who 
have lost jobs and who yearn to join a social context with the ultimate goal 
of securing regular employment and also would provide work incentives for 
those who have become complacent in a life of beneﬁ  t dependence. From 
a budgetary perspective, the measure would not cost anything in terms of 
payments to the unemployed, because they already receive beneﬁ  ts, and the 
social needs that could be met when the unemployed perform social work 
assignments presumably would outweigh the administrative costs of the 
program.
A new Swedish labor market program called the “activity guarantee” was 
introduced in 2000 with the goal of strengthening labor market prospects 
of UI recipients who are at risk of becoming long-  term unemployed. The 
program participants are entitled to unemployment beneﬁ  ts, but participa-
tion also is supposed to imply full-  time activity. The unemployment agen-
cies are instructed to organize both individual and group activities for the 
participants to be engaged in job search, regular labor market programs, 
and studies or activities arranged by ﬁ  rms, municipalities, and other govern-
ment agencies. Implementation of the program has encountered diﬃculties, 
as reported by Forslund, Fröberg, and Lindqvist (2004). More than half 
of interviewed supervisors at the unemployment agencies complain about 
insuﬃcient information concerning how to organize the activities, and the 
15. Ljungqvist (1999, section 6) discusses a number of conditions that a social work program 
for the unemployed should satisfy. A key condition is that the assignments should fall within 
a well-  delimited range of work that would not distort competition in the rest of the economy. 
Because of high turnover rates, the tasks should require minimal skill requirements. The fact 
that social work would not earn a market wage qualiﬁ  es it as a labor market program rather 
than an alternative to regular employment.How Sweden’s Unemployment Became More Like Europe’s    2 1 9
lack of manpower is cited as an explanation to why one- quarter of the agen-
cies have been unable to oﬀer full-  time activities. It can also be noted that 
only a small fraction of those with long unemployment spells have entered 
the program—the fraction was less than 3 percent among those with spells 
of at least two years. Despite the rather negative assessment of the pro-
gram to date by Forslund, Fröberg, and Lindqvist, we see this measure as 
a potential tool for implementing the social work requirement previously 
discussed.16
6.7.2      Jobs Are Not the Bottleneck
Whether there are enough jobs available in the economy is a question 
that is often raised in discussions of reforms aimed at reducing unemploy-
ment. In our search model, there is no lack of jobs, because the unemployed 
search against a wage oﬀer distribution, where one worker’s decision to 
accept a job does not impinge on the ability of other workers to ﬁ  nd jobs 
commensurate to their earnings potentials. Both historical evidence and 
economic theory support the notion that market economies will create jobs 
in response to workers’ aspirations that reﬂ  ect their marketable skills. For 
example, Blanchard (2006, 24) notes that “even in economies with high 
unemployment, exogenous movements in the labor force—due to demog-
raphy or repatriation, such as the return of European nationals after the 
independence of former colonies—translate fairly quickly into movements 
in employment.” In their treatise about European unemployment, Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman (1991, 73) also refute the view that the available work 
in an economy is given—the “lump-  of-  output fallacy.” As a consequence, 
they forcefully argue that early retirement and work sharing are not solu-
tions to Europe’s problem but rather are “excellent way[s] of making a coun-
try poorer.” Against this background, a recent Swedish initiative called the 
“free year,” which furloughs gainfully employed workers into a sabbatical 
year so that their vacant positions can be oﬀered to the unemployed, seems 
perverse.
6.7.3    Reform  Is  Imperative
Measures that facilitate job creation, such as those aimed at improving 
the conditions for entrepreneurs and small ﬁ  rms, as discussed by Davis and 
16. In addition to the considerations mentioned in note number 15, Ljungqvist (1999) argues 
why social work requirements should be imposed in a gradual fashion over unemployment 
spells. First, as in the analysis of optimal unemployment insurance by Shavell and Weiss (1979), 
the foremost purpose of imposing work requirements or reducing beneﬁ  ts is to provide the 
unemployed with correct incentives in their choice of search intensities and reservation wages. 
The anticipation of a future imposition of a work requirement, like the anticipation of a future 
reduction in beneﬁ  ts, induces an unemployed person to adjust his or her search behavior so 
that the probability of gaining employment increases today. Second, the gradual imposition 
is warranted, because in contrast to reductions in beneﬁ  ts, work requirements reduce the time 
left for the unemployed to search for regular employment.220        Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
Henrekson (chapter 7 in this volume), certainly would be helpful when try-
ing to reduce the ranks of the unemployed and early retirees in Sweden. 
However, we would like to emphasize that real success hinges critically upon 
reforms that increase the returns to employment relative to unemployment 
for workers who have experienced unfavorable labor market outcomes. 
Reform here is imperative, because a culture of nonemployment is not only 
diﬃcult to reverse but is also unfair to individuals who are lured into pro-
longed periods of nonactivity. They are exposed to the political risk that the 
rules of the game ultimately will change and that they will have to return 
with much diminished skills to a harsher labor market. The diﬃculties that 
France and Germany are having in implementing labor market reforms 
after decades of long-  term unemployment ought to serve as an early warn-
ing and to spur reform eﬀorts that could spare Swedish workers future 
hardships.
6.7.4      Post Scriptum: A New Swedish Government and Policy
Most observers of the Swedish national election in September 2006 attri-
bute the defeat of the incumbent Social Democratic government and the vic-
tory of the center- right coalition to diﬀerences in labor market policies. While 
the former government promised to raise the cap on labor income, below 
which the social insurance system replaces lost earnings during joblessness, 
the opposition oﬀered a diﬀerent vision in which beneﬁ  t dependency and the 
ranks of the jobless should be reduced, among other things, by increasing 
the relative return to work over nonemployment. Besides tax breaks on labor 
income, the new center- right government has decided to reduce replacement 
rates over unemployment spells and to impose activity/  work requirements 
(see Swedish Government [2007a, 2007b]). The replacement rate in the UI 
system becomes 80 percent during the ﬁ  rst 200 days of an unemployment 
spell, 70 percent during the next 100 days, and 65 percent thereafter. (Parents 
with children are allowed longer beneﬁ  t durations at the higher replacement 
rates.) After 300 days of unemployment, beneﬁ  t recipients are entitled and 
obliged to participate in a “job and development guarantee” that replaces 
the “activity guarantee” discussed earlier.
There are quite a few overlaps between these measures of the new Swedish 
government and our own proposal for reducing unemployment. Because the 
government’s lowest replacement rate of 65 percent is likely to be close to 
what is socially acceptable in Sweden, we believe for the reasons previously 
stated that the way the “job and development guarantee” is designed in prac-
tice will be vital. The Swedish Government (2007b, 34) lays out three phases 
for an unemployed worker who enters this program: the ﬁ  rst phase focuses 
on assistance with intensiﬁ  ed job search; the second phase involves a battery 
of instruments including retraining, trainee work, subsidized employment, 
and other activities aimed at raising the level of competence; and the ﬁ  nal 
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after 450 days under the Job and Development Guarantee, is assigned last-
ing socially valuable work that corresponds to the participant’s full labor 
supply.” We might quarrel about the duration and timing of the diﬀerent 
phases, but we prefer to reiterate on our previous comment that the last 
phase will be crucial for successfully reducing the ranks of the nonemployed. 
Properly designed, what we called social work will provide potent incentives 
to those nonemployed who are able to return to regular employment and 
will also serve as a meaningful source of activity for those who are unable 
or unwilling to make that transition.
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